

Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2098

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 13302

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR UR US

SUBJ: GROMYKO ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: DURING MY CALL ON HIM ON AUGUST 30 GROMYKO EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT PRESIDENT FORD HAS CLEARLY AND DEFINITELY EXPRESSED HIS INTENTION TO FOLLOW POLICIES AIMED AT IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES; VOICED INTEREST IN AN INVITATION TO WASHINGTON AFTER HIS SEPTEMBER 24 SPEECH TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY; AND PROVED TO BE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ON MFN PROSPECTS. ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS, GROMYKO EMPHASIZED THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS AND INDICATED SOME SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE US SIDE'S READINESS TO BEGIN WORK ON THE SALT II NEGOTIATIONS BY THE SCHEDULED OPENING OF THE NEXT SESSION ON SEPTEMBER 17. IN DISCUSSION OF SALT II ITSELF HE DWELT ON THE QUESTION OF QUANTIFICATION OF ASSYMETRIES, BUT CONCLUDED THAT SOME ASSYMETRIES SIMPLY ARE IMPOSSIBLE TO QUANTIFY; IN THESE INSTANCES HE ADVOCATED THAT WE RELY ON "NATURAL REASON." ON THE MIDDLE EAST, HE QUESTIONED THE US COMMITMENT TO THE MEPC IN GENEVA; EMPHASIZED THE VULNERABILITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO SOVIET TROUBLE-MAKING (THOUGH IMMEDIATELY DENYING THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ANY INTENTION TO ENGAGE IN SUCH ACTIVITY); AND BELABORED THE POINT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTS CONCERTED ACTION WITH THE US IN THE MIDDLE EAST, NOT CONSULTATIONS. HE SAID THAT THE USSR, UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, IS IN FAVOR OF A REGULATION OF RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. ON CYPRUS, HE ACCUSED THE US OF FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE ACTIONS WHICH LED TO CONFIDENTIAL

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THE PUTSCH IN NICOSIA, AND EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE US CONTRIBUTION TO A SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM HAS NOT BEEN AN EFFECTIVE ONE. HE DEFENDED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A CYPRUS CONFERENCE, BUT NOT WITH GREAT VEHEMENCE, AND HE CALLED

FOR US-SOVIET COOPERATION OVER CYPRUS. END SUMMARY.

2. GROMYKO RECEIVED ME THE EVENING OF AUGUST 30 FOR AN HOUR AND 25 MINUTE DISCUSSION. ALSO PRESENT WAS USA DIVISION CHIEF KORNIYENKO. GROMYKO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM A VACATION-- HIS SON AND DAUGHTER-IN-LAW JOINED HIM FROM WASHINGTON-- AND APPEARED TO BE IN FINE HEALTH AND GOOD SPIRITS. I THANKED HIM FOR SETTING ASIDE THE TIME TO SEE ME, AND INFORMED HIM THAT I WOULD BE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON ON SEPTEMBER 3 WHERE I WOULD BE SEEING THE SECRETARY.

3. I REMARKED THAT GROMYKO HIMSELF WOULD PROBABLY SOON BE GOING TO THE U.S. TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE CONFIRMED THIS, AND SAID THAT HE EXPECTED TO LEAVE FOR BONN SEPTEMBER 15, WHERE HE WOULD RETURN MINISTER SCHEEL'S OFFICIAL VISIT, OVERNIGHT IN BONN, THEN CONTINUE THE NEXT DAY TO NEW YORK. I SAID THAT THE SECRETARY WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING HIM IN NEW YORK. AFTER SOME DISCUSSIONS WE AGREED THAT IT WAS THE TURN OF THE SOVIET SIDE TO HOST THE TRADITIONAL WORKING DINNER THIS YEAR. GROMYKO SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY MAY BE THINKING OF INVITING HIM TO WASHINGTON FOR FURTHER TALKS AFTER HE SPEAKS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON SEPTEMBER 24. IF SO, THIS WOULD COINCIDE WITH HIS WISH. HE COULD ARRIVE ON SEPTEMBER 25 IF THAT WOULD BE CONVENIENT. HE SUGGESTED THAT CONCRETE PLANS FOR THE WASHINGTON VISIT BE MADE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE SECRETARY IN NEW YORK.

4. HE THEN ASKED ME WHAT KIND OF WINDS WERE BLOWING MY WAY FROM WASHINGTON. I ANSWERED THAT THE WIND FROM ALL INDICATIONS WAS A FAVORABLE ONE. THE OUTLOOK FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IS GOOD, AND I REFERRED TO PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY, TO HIS MANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE IMPORTANCE WHICH HE ASCRIBES TO US-USSR RELATIONS, AND TO HIS STATEMENT ON SALT IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE OF CONFIDENTIAL

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AUGUST 28. I CONCLUDED THAT THE INTENTION, AND THE WILL, TO FURTHER IMPROVE RELATIONS IS CERTAINLY PRESENT. I THEN ASKED HOW HE VIEWED THIS SAME QUESTION. HE REPLIED THAT HE AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE LEADERSHIP HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING AND CONTINUE TO FOLLOW VERY CLOSELY THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS, FOR OBVIOUS REASONS. PRESIDENT FORD HAS EXPRESSED VERY CLEARLY HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE POLICY WHICH MADE POSSIBLE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE RESULTS REACHED DURING THE THREE SUMMIT MEETINGS. HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES REGARD THESE RESULTS AS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT, AND BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE LED TO A VERY BASIC IMPROVEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. WE HAVE TAKEN ALL OF PRESIDENT FORD'S STATEMENTS INTO ACCOUNT, GROMYKO

CONTINUED, INCLUDING OF COURSE HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS, FOR THESE ARE VERY IMPORTANT TOO, AND WE BELIEVE THAT HE HAS CLEARLY AND DEFINITELY EXPRESSED HIS INTENTION TO FOLLOW POLICIES AIMED AT IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. IF THE WHITE HOUSE INDEED HEWS TO THIS POLICY LINE, THEN CONSIDERABLE OPTIMISM IS WARRANTED. THE SOVIET LINE REMAINS THE SAME AS IT WAS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT ACCESSION TO OFFICE. THE SOVIET WISH IS NOT ONLY TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE US, BUT TO MOVE FORWARD TO FURTHER IMPROVEMENT, NOT ONLY ON A POLITICAL LEVEL -- WHICH HE STRESSED WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT-- BUT IN ECONOMIC, TRADE, AND OTHER MATTERS AS WELL. WE THEN TURNED TO A DISCUSSION OF MORE SPECIFIC TOPICS.

5. TRADE: I NOTED THAT THE NEW SITUATION NOW PREVAILING IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WHITE HOUSE AND CONGRESS MAY MAKE IT SOMEWHAT EASIER FOR US TO SOLVE SEVERAL PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE BEEN CAUSING DIFFICULTY IN OUR RELATIONS. GROMYKO REPLIED THAT HE OF COURSE HAD NOTED WITH INTEREST THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENTS ON THE MFN QUESTION, AND IT SEEMS THAT THAT PROBLEM MAY BE EASING SOMEWHAT. IF THE PROBLEM IS COMPLETELY DONE AWAY WITH, OUR RELATIONS WILL BE PLACED ON A FIRMER BASIS. I ADDED THAT IT IS MY IMPRESSION THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD TAKEN A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE MATTER; HE EVIDENTLY HAS ACHIEVED SOME PROGRESS, THOUGH MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE.

6. ARMS CONTROL: IN DISCUSSING QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL
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INTEREST TO OUR TWO COUNTRIES; GROMYKO REMARKED THAT THE "OLD BUT NEW" PROBLEM OF SALT, THE ARMS RACE, AND SIMILAR MATTERS WERE STILL WITH US. THESE PROBLEMS ARE IN FACT ONE LARGE ARENA OF RELATED PROBLEMS, SOLUTIONS FOR WHICH CAN ONLY BE FOUND BY DIRT OF MUCH HARD WORK. WE HAVE FOUND, HE CONTINUED, THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO ATTACK THE WHOLE ARENA OF THESE PROBLEMS AT ONCE, AND HAVE LEARNED TO DIVIDE DISTINCT ASPECTS OUT INTO NEGOTIABLE PROBLEM AREAS. BUT WE MUST WORK, HE STRESSED; WE CANNOT SIT BY A FIREPLACE, WARMING OUR FEET, AND DRINKING VODKA. NEGOTIATION OF A SOLUTION TO THESE PROBLEMS IS TOO IMPORTANT FOR US AND FOR THE FUTURE. THESE SOLUTIONS WILL NOT FALL OUT OF THE SKY ON THEIR OWN; WE WILL HAVE TO DRAG THEM DOWN. HE ASSURED ME THAT AS FAR AS HIS GOVERNMENT IS CONCERNED, THESE PROBLEMS ARE NOT MERE EXERCISES IN THEORY, BUT CONSTITUENT PARTS OF PRACTICAL POLICY.

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7. I ASSURED HIM OUR SIDE IS ALSO TAKING A VERY SERIOUS APPROACH TO THESE PROBLEMS, AS HE WOULD FIND DURING HIS CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON. I ADDED THAT THE SECRETARY WAS ALSO PLANNING ON COMING TO MOSCOW IN OCTOBER TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION ON THESE MATTERS. I THEN ASKED IF HE HAD ANY SPECIFIC ASPECT OF ARMS CONTROL MATTERS HE MIGHT WISH TO DISCUSS WITH ME. HE PAUSED BRIEFLY, THEN REMARKED THAT PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS IS STILL MUCH MORE OF A CURRENT PROBLEM THAN IT IS USUALLY CONSIDERED TO BE. HE CONTINUED THAT SO MANY COUNTRIES ARE NOT FULLY PARTICIPATING IN THE NPT THAT 2 OR 4 OR 10 COUNTRIES COULD ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. AND AS THE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES ACQUIRING THESE ARMS INCREASES, THE DIFFICULTY OF ASSURING ANY KIND OF CONTROL OF THESE ARMS INCREASES GEOMETRICALLY. I ASSURED HIM THAT WE VIEWED THE PROBLEM AS A SERIOUS ONE, AND DID ALL WE COULD TO INFLUENCE COUNTRIES NOT YET SIGNATORY TO THE NPT TO BECOME SO, AND THOSE THAT HAVE SIGNED TO RATIFY. HE AGREED THAT THIS WAS HELPFUL, AND SAID THE USSR WAS DOING LIKEWISE. HE ADDED THAT SUCH EFFORTS SHOULD NOT BE UNDERTAKEN ON A "CAMPAIGN" BASIS, BUT SHOULD RATHER BE CARRIED OUT SYSTEMATICALLY. OTHERWISE, THROUGH OUR CARELESSNESS WE WOULD ALLOW THE CREATION OF A DANGEROUS SITUATION.

8. SALT: TURNING TO SALT, WHICH HE REPEATEDLY REFERRED TO AS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND ACUTE PROBLEMS WE FACE, GROMYKO STATED THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD CONFIDENTIAL

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BE READY TO GO TO WORK WHEN THE NEXT SESSION OPENED IN GENEVA ON SEPTEMBER 17. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT OUR DELEGATION WOULD BE READY AS WELL. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, HE CONTINUED, IF ALL OF THE WORK OF NEGOTIATING SHOULD FALL ON THE SHOULDERS OF ONE DELEGATION. I TOLD HIM THAT I THOUGHT THAT BOTH SIDES PROBABLY HAD HOMEWORK YET TO DO. I STRESSED TO HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SECRETARY'S CONCERN ABOUT THE TIME LIMIT UNDER WHICH

NEGOTIATIONS ON SALT II ARE OPERATING. BOTH SIDES FACE PRESSURES TO SPEED UP ARMAMENT DEVELOPMENT BECAUSE OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL RISK INVOLVED, AND BOTH SIDES SHOULD UNDERTAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SHOW AS MUCH RESTRAINT AND CONTROL AS THEY COULD UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. GROMYKO THEN ASSURED ME THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE US GOVERNMENT AND THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP REALIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. HE DOES NOT QUESTION THIS AT ALL. THE MANY STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT NIXON, BY PRESIDENT FORD, AND BY THE SECRETARY TO THIS EFFECT HAVE BEEN CONVINCING. THE DIFFICULTY, OF COURSE, IS THAT SOME ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEMS FACED IN THE SALT II NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT EASILY LEND THEMSELVES TO SOLUTION. THE SOUL OF EACH OF THESE PROBLEMS SEEMS TO REVOLVE AROUND NUMBERS, AROUND QUANTIFICATION. I ASKED IF OUR SUGGESTION TO AIM FOR A LONGER TIME FRAME FOR ANY AGREEMENT HAD NOT MADE THINGS SOMEWHAT EASIER. HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD IN PRINCIPLE AGREED TO THIS, AND PERHAPS IT WILL BE EASIER. IN ANY CASE, HE CONTINUED, HE HOPES THE AMERICAN SIDE WILL BE MORE OBJECTIVE IN THEIR APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID WE HAD SIMILAR HOPES CONCERNING THE SOVIET SIDE. GROMYKO REMARKED THAT HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO HEARING FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY ON THESE ISSUES. BUT BOTH SIDES MUST BE OBJECTIVE. NEITHER SIDE CAN EXPECT IN ANY WAY TO DECREASE THE SECURITY OF THE OTHER SIDE; BOTH SIDES SHOULD PROFIT FROM THE AGREEMENT. I NOTED THAT THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING EQUIVALENCE REMAINED ONE OF THE GREAT DIFFICULTIES. HE AGREED, AND ASKED RHETORICALLY IF SOME FACTORS COULD EVER BE REDUCED TO NUMBERS. HOW DOES ONE QUANTIFY THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR? HE CONCLUDED THAT IN THE END WE WOULD SIMPLY HAVE TO RELY ON "NATURAL REASON" AND PLUNGE FORWARD

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TOWARD A SOLUTION. HE ADDED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT SHOULD NEVER THINK THAT THE SOVIET SIDE UNDERESTIMATES THE DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN THESE PROBLEMS, OR THAT IT HAS IN ANY WAY SLACKENED ITS INTEREST IN FINDING THEIR SOLUTIONS. HE POINTED OUT ONE FINAL PROBLEM ASSOCIATED WITH NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS SALT: HOW FAR SHOULD TWO NATIONS SUCH AS THE US AND THE USSR GO IN REACHING AGREEMENTS OF SUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER NON-PARTICIPATING STATES? HE QUICKLY ADDED THAT WHEREVER THAT POINT MAY BE, WE HAVE YET TO REACH IT; BOTH SIDES MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARD AN AGREEMENT. HE REPEATED, HOWEVER, THAT "OTHER COUNTRIES" EXIST AND SOONER OR LATER MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

9. MIDDLE EAST: GROMYKO SAID THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT, THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION REMAINS ACUTE. IN HIS WORDS, SOMETHING WAS DONE--SOMETHING INDEFINITE, PERHAPS NEITHER

POSITIVE NOR NEGATIVE, BUT THE BASIC PROBLEMS REMAIN. I AGREED THAT THE STEPS TAKEN SO FAR WERE SIMPLY STEPS TOWARD A SOLUTION AND NOT YET THE SOLUTION ITSELF. WE WERE CONDUCTING TALKS IN WASHINGTON NOW WITH THE CONCERNED STATES ATTEMPTING TO FURTHER IMPROVE OUR-UNDERSTANDING OF THE MATTER. WE DO NOT PLAN TO MAKE ANY DECISIONS ON THE MATTER AS YET; DECISIONS, INCLUDING THE TIMING FOR RECONVENING IN GENEVA, SHOULD EMERGE ON THE BASIS OF CONSENSUS. WE WISHED TO CONSULT WITH ALL INTERESTED PARTIES, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION. GROMYKO INTERRUPTED AT THIS POINT TO SAY THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE US POSITION ON A MEPC. THREE MONTHS AGO HE THOUGHT THAT THE US WOULD AGREE TO CONTINUE THE CONFERENCE IN GENEVA. NOW WASHINGTON IS VERY RESERVED IN ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD GENEVA. WHEN SHOULD GENEVA RECONVENE? WHY IS THE US SO RESERVED ON THIS POINT? HE ASSURED ME THAT NOT MATTER WHAT THE FORUM, PROBLEMS OF THIS NATURE DID NOT LEND THEMSELVES TO SOLUTION BY VOTING; RATHER, CONSENSUS HAD TO BE REACHED IN JOINT COUNCIL. WE WHOULD NOT WAIT TO RECONVENE GENEVA UNTIL ALL QUESTIONS HAD BEEN SOLVED IN ADVANCE.

10. I EXPLAINED THAT THE ARABS BETWEEN THEMSELVES HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHEN THEY WANT GENEVA TO RECONVENE. HE REPLIED THAT EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT THE ARABS SOMETIMES CONFIDENTIAL

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NEED HELP TO REACH AGREEMENT BETWEEN THEMSELVES. THE JOINT ASSISTANCE OF THE US AND USSR WOULD HELP THEM COME TO AN AGREEMENT MUCH MORE EASILY. HE CONTINUED THAT IT WOULD BE GOOD TO COME TOGETHER TO DISCUSS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE VARIOUS POSITIONS. HE FOR ONE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE ISRAELI POSITION AT ALL. THE USSR, REGARDLESS OF WHAT ISRAEL BELIEVES, WANTS PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST; IT IS NOT TRYING TO OBTAIN MILITARY BASES OR OTHER ADVANTAGES. HE SAID WITH SOME EMPHASIS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD SHOWN RESTRAINT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND HE BELIEVED THAT WASHINGTON HAD NOT OVERLOOKED THAT. I ASSURED HIM THAT THAT WAS TRUE. HE CONTINUED THAT THE ONLY WAY SOVIET POLICY RAN COUNTER TO ISRAELI INTERESTS WAS THAT IT REFUSED TO GRANT ISRAEL THE RIGHT TO ANNEX ARAB LANDS. OTHER THAN THAT IT WAS IN NO WAY OPPOSED TO ISRAELI INTERESTS. IT FAVORED THE ENDING OF A STATE OF HOSTILITY. THE SOVIET UNION, UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER REGULATION OF ITS RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. IT WAS IN FAVOR OF RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL BY THE ARAB STATES, AND CERTAINLY IN FAVOR OF ITS RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO EXIST AS A STATE. SOVIET POLICY WAS ALSO FOR ANY NECESSARY GUARANTEE-BE IT BY THE US-USSR, BY THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL PLUS TWO OR PLUS FIVE OR WHATEVER. HE CONCLUDED THAT HE FAILED TO SEE WHAT SECURITY ISRAEL THINKS IT GETS OUT OF A THIN STRIP OF LAND IN THE LAST THIRD OF THE TWENTIETH

CENTURY; SURELY IT REALIZES THIS IS NOT SECURITY.

11. I EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT PART OF THE PROBLEM INVOLVED A STATE OF MIND ON ISRAEL'S PART. PAST EXPERIENCES CREATED EMOTIONS WHICH WERE NOT EASILY DISSIPATED. THE US CONTINUES TO FAVOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS BEARING ON THIS QUESTION, AND WE CONTINUE TO TRY TO INFLUENCE ISRAEL IN THIS DIRECTION. HOWEVER, THIS WILL BE A LONG PROCESS. GROMYKO REMARKED WITH SOME RESIGNATION THAT WE KNOW THE ISRAELIS BETTER THAN HE DOES. HE CONTINUED THAT THE USSR WOULD LIKE TO SEE REAL PROGRESS ON THIS QUESTION. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS ARE READY TO TAKE PART IN "CONCERTED ACTION" TO ACHIEVE THIS PROGRESS; HE REALIZES, HOWEVER, THAT THE US IS SUSPICIOUS OF "CONCERTED ACTION." GROMYKO CONTINUED
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THAT "IF OTHERS DO NOT WANT THIS PROGRESS (GROMYKO WAS OBVIOUSLY REFERRING TO THE US HERE, BUT ATTEMPTING TO MAKE IT IMPERSONAL), THEN THE MIDDLE EAST WILL NOT REMAIN AS IT IS NOW...". HE CONTINUED THAT IT "WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO CAUSE TROUBLE, IF WE WERE SO INCLINED...". HE THEREUPON IMMEDIATELY DISCLAIMED ANY SOVIET INTENTION OF CAUSING DIFFICULTIES IN THE AREA, REPEATING SOVIET DESIRES FOR PEACE IN THE AREA.

12. I ASSURED GROMYKO THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THIS, BUT ADDED THAT WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT SOME STEPS TOWARD A SOLUTION CAN BEST BE TAKEN SEPARATELY, OTHER IN CONSULTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AND ALWAYS TAKING SOVIET INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT. GROMYKO POUCHED ON THIS STATEMENT, PROCLAIMING THIS TO BE THE DIFFERENCE IN OUR APPROACH TO THE QUESTION. WE, HE SAID, ARE INTERESTED IN CONCERTED ACTION, AND YOU SAY ONLY THAT YOU WISH TO CONSULT. IT IS POSSIBLE, HE CONTINUED, TO CONSULT WITH ONE ANOTHER, AND THEN PROCEED TO TAKE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED ACTIONS. CONSULTATION IS OBVIOUSLY NOT ENOUGH. I DENIED THAT THIS WAS A CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF OUR INTENTIONS. HE CONTINUED THAT WHEN BREZHNEV HAD SPOKEN TO NIXON ON THIS MATTER, HE HAD ALWAYS HAD ACTION, NOT CONSULTATION, IN MIND. I REPLIED THAT IF BOTH SIDES AIM FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND SOME WAY TO CONSULT ON ACHIEVING THIS COMMON GOAL. GROMYKO INDICATED HIS BELIEF THAT WE STILL HAD DIVERGENCIES RE THE MIDDLE EAST AND ASKED THAT I PASS TO THE SECRETARY THAT HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT WITH HIM.

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13. CYPRUS: GROMYKO STATED THAT HE "FRANKLY DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE US POSITION ON CYPRUS." HE SAID THAT HE HAD CAREFULLY STUDIED ALL OF THE PERTINENT US STATEMENTS, BUT WAS STILL IN THE DARK ABOUT TWO POINTS: (1) WHY DIDN'T THE US STOP THE GREEK JUNTA FROM PURSURING ITS PLANS REGARDING CYPRUS? DON'T TRY TO CONVINCE US THAT YOU DIDN'T KNOW WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN. IN WHOSE INTEREST HAVE THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEKS BEEN? EVEN IF THE ACTORS WERE WELL-INTENTIONED IN THE BEGINNING, WHAT THEY HAVE DONE IS WRONG. IT WAS VERY RECKLESS AND HOSTILE ON THE PART OF THE GREEK JUNTA.

I OF COURSE STRONGLY REJECTED HIS IMPLICATION THAT WE COULD CONTROL THE GREEK JUNTA AND HIS ACCUSATION THAT WE KNEW IN ADVANCE WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN. I POINTED OUT THAT WHAT HAS HAPPENED HAS CERTAINLY NOT SERVED OUR INTERESTS.

GROMYKO THEN MADE HIS SECOND POINT:

(2) WHY, IF THE US IS INTERESTED IN A SETTLEMENT, ISN'T IT MAKING A MORE EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TOWARD THAT END? THE TRI-POWER FORUM IN GENEVA HAS SHOWN ITSELF TO BE INEFFECTIVE. A NEW FORUM SHOULD THUS BE FOUND. THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT MADE ITS PROPOSAL BECAUSE OF ANY DESIRE TO GET INVOLVED IN THE AREA. WE SIMPLY WERE TRYING TO COME UP WITH CONFIDENTIAL

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A WAY TO SOLVE THIS DIFFICULT PROBLEM. IT IS NOT OUR INTENTION TO ESTABLISH ANY MILITARY BASES IN THE AREA; ON THE CONTRARY, WE WISH TO SEE ALL FOREIGN TROOPS REMOVED. WE WANT POLITICAL GUARANTEES, NOT MILITARY ONES. WHAT IS WRONG WITH THIS POSITION? THE US ATTITUDE TOWARD OUR PROPOSAL, IF NOT NEGATIVE, CERTAINLY IS RESERVED. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING CYPRUS ARE BEING IGNORED--FOR ONE REASON BECAUSE NATIONS SUCH AS

THE US ARE DOING NOTHING TO SEE THAT THESE RESOLUTIONS ARE RESPECTED. WHAT WILL KISSINGER SAY ABOUT THIS?

14. I ASSURED HIM THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD BE SURPRISED AT GROMYKO'S ASSERTION THAT WE ARE IGNORING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, AND POINTED OUT THE SECRETARY'S PERSONSUADE ALL PARTIES TO OBSERVE THE UN RESOLUTIONS.

I SAID THAT WE HAVE SUPPORTED THE LONDON-ZURICH AGREEMENTS BECAUSE WE HAVE BELIEVED THEY ARE THE BEST FRAMEWORK IN WHICH TO WORK TOWARD A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE RECENT MEETING OF CLERIDES AND DENKTASH, AND IT IS OUR PRELIMINARY VIEW THAT WE SHOULD STICK TO THE EXISTING FORUM RATHER THEN EMBARK ON A SEARCH FOR A NEW ONE. GROMYKO COMMENTED THAT SUCH A COURSE WOULD LEAD TO WAR AGAIN IN THE FUTURE JUST AS IT HAD LED TO

THE SOLUTION. I ALSO REJECTED THE VIEWPOINT COMMONLY EXPRESSED IN THE SOVIET MEDIA THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CYPRUS SITUATION RESTS IN NATO HANDS, POINTING OUT THAT THE RESULTS HAVE CERTAINLY NOT PROFITED THE ALLIANCE. GROMYKO ENDED DISCUSSION ON THE MATTER BY SAYING THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD LIKE TO STOP BLOODSHED ON THE ISLAND; AND IN ANY CASE, IT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A PURELY DOMESTIC CYPRIOT PROBLEM. ITS INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS ARE OBVIOUS. IT IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE US AND THE USSR TO DEMONSTRATE THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION. UNFORTUNATELY, THE US POSITION ON OUR PROPOSAL--AND "RESERVED" MAY BE AN UNDERSTATEMENT IN DESCRIBING THIS POSITION--DOES NOT ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN.

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15. FAMILY REUNIFICATION: TOWARD THE END OF THE CONVERSATION I BROUGHT UP THE MATTER OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION, EXPLAINING THAT IT WAS OF PERSONAL IMPORTANCE TO ME, AS WELL AS THE THE US GOVERNMENT, AND ADDING THAT IT WAS A MATTER WHICH AROUSED CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE US, AND IN THE CONGRESS. GROMYKO JOKINGLY INQUIRED WHAT TYPE OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION I WAS REFERRING TO--A MAN COMING HOME TO HIS WIFE AFTER WORK? KORNIYENKO INTERRUPTED TO EXPLAIN TO GROMYKO THAT THE EMBASSY HAS SUBMITTED LISTS FROM TIME TO TIME OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION CASES IN WHICH IT IS INTERESTED. KORNIYENKO INSISTED THAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN MANY INSTANCES; I AGREED; AND ADDED THAT WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE IS MORE OF THE SAME. GROMYKO PROTESTED THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS TOPIC. HE CAUTIONED THAT THE US SHOULD NOT IN ANY CASE EXPECT "THINGS TO HAPPEN LIKE LIGHTNING" WHEN WE SUBMIT SUCH A LIST. HE CONTINUED THAT IN MANY INSTANCES IT HAD TURNED OUT THAT WASHINGTON HAD TOLD MFA THAT A CERTAIN PERSON WANTED TO EMIGRATE,

BUT THAT PERSON HIMSELF HAD DENIED ANY SUCH DESIRE.
(IN REACHING FOR SUCH SHOPWORN ARGUMENTS, GROMYKO
DISPLAYED FULL WELL THAT HE WAS WELL ACQUAINTED WITH
FAMILY REUNIFICATION MATTERS.) GROMYKO ASSURED ME
THAT IN ANY CASE NOTHING ARTIFICIAL IS DONE, FOR
REASONS OF SECURITY OR OTHERWISE, TO SLOW THE NATURAL
PROCESSING OF EMIGRANT APPLICATIONS FOR EXIT PAPERS.
I EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS A MATTER ON WHICH THERE
IS CONSIDERABLE CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE, AND
ENDED BY NOTING WE WOULD APPRECIATE HIS HELP.
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